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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Holly Judge resigned her position at the Shikellamy 
School District after she was arrested on suspicion of drunk 
driving. Judge sued Shikellamy and a number of its officers 
(the Individual Defendants), claiming she was constructively 
discharged in violation of her constitutional and contractual 
rights. Because there is no genuine dispute that Judge resigned 
voluntarily, we will affirm. 
I1 
 Judge had been principal of Oaklyn Elementary School 
for about three years when, on the evening of May 30, 2014, 
she was stopped by a Pennsylvania State Trooper for failing to 
signal as she pulled into traffic. After acknowledging she had 
been drinking, Judge became upset and asked the trooper to let 
her go because she was concerned about her job. The trooper 
declined and took Judge to the State Police barracks, where she 
was given a blood alcohol test. The test showed that Judge’s 
blood alcohol content was .332, more than four times the legal 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the District Court’s summary judgment de 
novo. Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys. of Higher 
Ed., 880 F.3d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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limit. Judge was released from the barracks that night without 
being informed of the test results.  
 A few weeks later, Judge had three encounters with 
Shikellamy Superintendent Patrick Kelley. Having been 
advised by two school board members that Judge had been the 
subject of a traffic stop, Kelley walked into Judge’s office, shut 
the door, and began asking her questions about the incident. 
Later that day, around 3:00 p.m., Kelley summoned Judge to 
his own office. As soon as Judge arrived, Kelley gave her a 
letter to read. The letter stated three things: first, Kelley knew 
that Judge had been stopped on suspicion of drunk driving; 
second, Judge had not disclosed the events of May 30 until 
confronted 20 days later; and third, Judge had a choice to make. 
In Kelley’s words, the “underlying facts” required him to ask 
for Judge’s “immediate resignation.” App. 120. The letter 
continued: 
If you do choose to resign then I 
will offer a neutral reference in the 
future upon inquiry. . . . [I]n the 
alternative, if you decide not to 
resign and DUI charges are filed 
against you then I will be forced to 
issue a written statement of 
charges for dismissal. These 




• Immorality - conduct which 
offends the morals of the 
Commonwealth and is a 
bad example to the youth 
whose ideals a professional 
educator . . . has a duty to 
foster and elevate. . . . 
This letter is delivered on . . . June 
19, 2014, and I await your answer 
on, or before, 12:30 [p.m.] on June 
20, 2014. 
App. 120–21.2 After reading the letter, Judge asked Kelley if 
there was “anything [she] could do,” App. 201, but Kelley said 
there was not. By the time Judge left Kelley’s office, it was 
about 4:00 p.m. Judge went home and spoke with her mother 
about the situation but did not contact a lawyer, even though 
she had retained counsel after her arrest in anticipation of 
possible criminal charges. Ultimately, Judge decided to resign 
her position.  
 The next day, Judge met with Kelley for a third time and 
presented him with a letter of resignation. Before handing 
Kelley the letter, Judge told him she “was not even charged 
with DUI yet.” App. 202. Kelley then handed Judge some court 
documents indicating that, in fact, she had been charged. That 
was the first time Judge learned she had been charged with DUI 
under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) and 
                                                 
2  The letter also alleged two other grounds for 
termination—“moral turpitude” and “intemperance”—which 
the parties have not discussed on appeal. 
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§ 3802(c) (highest rate of alcohol), as well as a number of 
related moving violations.  
 Almost a year later, Judge sued Shikellamy and the 
Individual Defendants in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. She asserted four 
claims—deprivation of procedural due process, deprivation of 
substantive due process, violation of equal protection, and 
breach of contract—all arising out of the common allegation 
that Shikellamy had constructively discharged her. The 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court 
granted in part and denied in part. The District Court held that 
the Individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
and dismissed them from the case. As to Shikellamy, the Court 
dismissed Judge’s substantive due process, equal protection, 
and contract claims in full. And it dismissed her procedural due 
process claim to the extent it alleged a deprivation of Judge’s 
liberty interest in her reputation. The District Court granted 
Judge leave to amend so she could supplement her contract and 
procedural due process claims against Shikellamy. After Judge 
filed an amended complaint, Shikellamy answered, the parties 
conducted discovery on those two theories, and the District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Shikellamy. 
Judge filed a timely notice of appeal from both the Court’s 
dismissal of the Individual Defendants and its summary 
judgment for Shikellamy.  
II 
 The District Court recognized that neither Judge’s 
procedural due process nor her breach of contract claim could 
go to a jury unless there was a genuine dispute as to whether 
she had been constructively discharged or had voluntarily 
resigned. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Leheny v. City of 
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Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court held 
that Judge had failed to demonstrate such a dispute and granted 
summary judgment for Shikellamy on both claims. We agree. 
 Our case law establishes a presumption that when 
employees resign, they do so freely, so the onus is on Judge to 
produce “evidence to establish that the resignation . . . was 
involuntarily procured.” Leheny, 183 F.3d at 227. In cases like 
this appeal, where Judge does not claim she was misled into 
resigning, we ask whether Shikellamy “force[d] the 
resignation . . . by coercion or duress.” Id. at 228. We apply an 
objective standard—the ultimate issue is not what Judge 
herself felt or believed, but whether a reasonable person under 
the circumstances “would have felt compelled to resign.” 
Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 502 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Duffy v. Paper Magic Grp., Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 
(3d Cir. 2001)).3 
 Before today, we have not explained how claims of 
constructive discharge should be evaluated. Consequently, the 
parties have focused their attention on a non-exhaustive list of 
factors identified by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
3 Unlike her due process claim, Judge’s contract claim 
is governed by Pennsylvania rather than federal law. But the 
difference here is immaterial because Pennsylvania appears to 
apply essentially the same standard to distinguish between 
voluntary resignations and constructive discharges. See Helpin 
v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 969 A.2d 601, 614 & n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2009) (framing the inquiry in terms of “whether a reasonable 




Eleventh Circuit, which we think provides a useful framework 
for decision. As that court has explained: 
Other circuits addressing this issue 
have indicated that certain factors 
may be helpful in determining 
whether the resignation was 
obtained by coercion or duress: 
(1) whether the employee was 
given some alternative to 
resignation; (2) whether the 
employee understood the nature of 
the choice [s]he was given; 
(3) whether the employee was 
given a reasonable time in which to 
choose; (4) whether the employee 
was permitted to select the 
effective date of the resignation; 
and (5) whether the employee had 
the advice of counsel. 
Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 
1995) (citing Angarita v. St. Louis Cty., 981 F.2d 1537, 1544 
(8th Cir. 1992); Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 
F.2d 167, 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1988); Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 
F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air 
Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also Leheny, 
183 F.3d at 227–28 (favorably citing Hargray). The District 
Court concluded that the balance of those factors was not 
enough for a reasonable jury to find that Judge had overcome 
the presumption that her resignation was voluntary. We 
substantially agree with the District Court’s careful analysis. 
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 Initially, we note that Judge was presented with a 
reasonable alternative to immediate resignation, having 
Shikellamy issue a “written statement of charges for dismissal,” 
after which the terms of her employment contract entitled her 
to a hearing before she could actually be terminated. See App. 
120, 150. Judge’s argument in response—that this was an 
illusory alternative because Shikellamy lacked good cause to 
seek her termination—fails. Pennsylvania law permits the 
termination of tenured school employees for “immorality,” 24 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1122, and the Commonwealth Court has 
previously held that “certain circumstances . . . involving 
drinking and driving may constitute conduct that is immoral” 
under that provision, Zelno v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 
12 Bd. of Dirs., 786 A.2d 1022, 1026 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2001). As the District Court observed, given that Judge was 
charged with the category of DUI applicable to the highest 
BAC levels, Shikellamy could reasonably have believed that 
“there existed ‘certain circumstances’ making [her] DUI arrest 
immoral” and a valid basis for termination. Judge v. Shikellamy 
Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 1550042, at *14–15 (M.D. Pa. May 1, 
2017). This was not a situation where, because “the reason for 
the threatened removal could not be substantiated,” the choice 
between resignation and the initiation of termination 
proceedings was “purely coercive.” Schultz, 810 F.2d at 1136. 
 Second, any reasonable school principal in Judge’s 
position would have understood the nature of her choice 
between resignation and charges followed by a pre-termination 
hearing. Judge’s own employment contract, which she had to 
sign each year she worked for the District, said Judge could be 
terminated only after written notice and a hearing. Even 
assuming Judge believed in good faith that her options were 
between resignation and immediate termination, her subjective 
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state of mind is immaterial to the objective legal standard that 
applies in this case. 
 Third, although Judge had less than 24 hours to make a 
decision after Kelley’s ultimatum, all of these events took 
place almost three weeks after Judge was actually arrested. The 
circumstances of that arrest put Judge on notice (as they would 
have any reasonable person) that she was at serious risk of 
being charged with a high-level DUI. And given the 
disapprobation society attaches to driving under the influence 
of alcohol, Judge’s arrest at least raised the possibility that she 
might be terminated for “immorality” as a result. As the 
District Court put it, the clear “possible effect of a DUI on the 
night of her arrest” gave Judge “more than two weeks to 
foresee the ‘gathering storm.’” Judge, 2017 WL 1550042, at 
*16–17. 
 The final two factors—the ability to set her own 
resignation date and the advice of counsel—favor Judge to 
some extent. But in light of the other factors we have discussed, 
and considering the fact that Judge made no attempt to seek 
advice from anyone but her mother over two weeks, we agree 
with the District Court that the final two factors don’t suffice 
to carry Judge’s burden. Judge’s decision was presumptively 
voluntary, and no reasonable jury could find otherwise on this 
record. That conclusion dooms her contract and procedural due 
process theories. 
III 
 Judge’s remaining claims fare no better. She has 
abandoned her equal protection and substantive due process 
arguments on appeal by allotting them only one sentence 
apiece in her opening brief. See Judge Br. 32–33; New Jersey 
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v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 640 F.3d 545, 547 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2011). Moreover, with those claims having been abandoned 
and summary judgment having been properly granted on the 
others, we have no basis to conclude that Judge can establish a 
substantive constitutional violation. We therefore have no 
reason to disturb the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 
Individual Defendants based on qualified immunity. See De 
Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 452 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2017). 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment in favor of the Shikellamy School 
District and its order dismissing the Individual Defendants. 
